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Commentary 
Eminent Domain: Judicial and 

Legislative Responses to Keio 

Alan C. Weinstein 
It has been almost a year and a half 
since the Supreme Court ruled in Keio 
v. City ofNew London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 
(2005), that the federal Constitution 
does not bar government from using 
eminent domain for economic develop­
ment purposes. That ruling precipi­
tated an unprecedented negative reac­
tion in state legislatures. 1 Now, Ohio 
has delivered the first post-Keio state 
supreme court decision to address the 
constitutionality of eminent domain. 
On July 26, in City ofNorwood v. 
Horney, 2006 WL 2096001, a unani­
mous Ohio Supreme Court rejected 
the arguments of the majority in Keio 
and emphatically stated that the Ohio 
constitution prohibits the use of emi­
nent domain solely for the purpose of 
providing an economic benefit to the 
government and community. This 
commentary discusses and analyzes 
both the Norwood ruling and the vari­
ous state and federal legislative 
responses to Keio. 
THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S 
NORWOOD DECISION 
The Norwood case presented facts that 
should sound familiar to planners in 
older urban areas. The city of Norwood 
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joint faculty appointment In the Maxine Goodman Levin 
College of Urban Affairs. He also serves as director of the 
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is a "first-ring" Cincinnati suburb. As 
with many such cities, it has seen its job­
base erode due to the continuing 
decline in manufacturing. It also saw the 
fabric of many of its neighborhoods dis­
rupted by the construction of federal 
interstate highways from the early 1960s 
through the early 1970s. With its tax 
base shrinking, the city eliminated jobs 
and cut services but still fell millions of 
dollars in debt. In 2003, the city sup­
ported a private developer's proposal to 
redevelop a neighborhood that had been 
in decline since the completion of 
Interstate 71 in 1974. The project, 
Rookwood Exchange, would add 200 
new apartments and condominiums and 
more than 500,000 square feet of com­
mercial space, yielding nearly $2 million 
in annual revenue to the city. · 
The developers, Anderson Real 
Estate and Miller-Valentine Group, 
requested that the city acquire the 
properties by eminent domain, but 
Norwood insisted that the developers 
first negotiate with the owners. The 
developers secured sales agreements 
with a substantial majority of the own­
ers, at which point the city agreed to 
acquire 12 remaining properties whose 
owners refused to sell. 
As required by the city code, 
Norwood commissioned a consulting 
firm-paid for by the developer-to 
conduct an urban renewal study prior 
to initiating eminent domain proceed­
ings. That study concluded that the 
properties to be acquired were in a 
"deteriorating area," which allowed the 
city to proceed with its acquisition 
effort. After the property owners' chal­
lenge to the exercise of eminent 
domain lost at trial, they appealed but 
were unable to obtain an injunction 
barring the city from acquiring their 
properties pending the appeal because 
Ohio statute ORC § 163.19 allows a city 
to obtain and transfer titles to con­
demned properties if it deposits with 
the court the full amount of the com­
pensation awards. Norwood did just 
that and the developer began demol­
ishing the houses in the neighborhood. 
But when the owners' appeal reached 
the Ohio Supreme Court, it ordered a 
halt to any further demolitions pending 
its ruling. 
That ruling was announced in a 
unanimous opinion that is easily the 
most expansive and scholarly land use 
decision handed down by the Ohio 
court in recent decades. Obviously, the 
1. See, e.g., Keio and Counting, 
PLANNING, June 2006. 
I 
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. Shorn~ early media reports of the Norwood decision suggested 
1t at 1t ca led for heightened judicial scrutiny of any exercise 
of eminent domain. This is not so. 
justices were well aware that theirs was 
the first state supreme court decision in 
the wake of Keio and would be closely 
scrutinized. They likely were also 
aware that experienced land use law 
commentators would be looking for any 
missteps, since this was the court 
which had somehow managed to 
announce a conjunctive "two-part tak­
ings test" 2 at a time when the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Agins decision called 
for a disjunctive test.3 
The Norwood opinion addressed 
both substantive and procedural con­
cerns. First, as previously noted, the 
court held that the Ohio constitution 
prohibits the use of eminent domain 
solely for the purpose of providing an 
economic benefit to the government 
and community. The court framed this 
part of its· opinion in terms of "resolv­
ing the inherent tension between the 
individual's right to possess and pre­
serve property and the state's compet­
ing interests in taking it for the com­
munal good." City ofNorwood v. Horney, 
2006 WL 2096001 at 10. The court's 
analysis on this point began by affirm­
ing that "Ohio has always considered 
the right of property to be a fundamen­
tal right." Id. at 9 (citations omitted). 
Turning next to an examination of the 
state's power of eminent domain, the 
court, after documenting at length the 
evolution of the "public use" concept 
from its pre-Revolutionary origins to the 
expansive interpretation given the term 
in the 20th century, opined that the Ohio 
Constitution does not support the broad 
definition of public use announced by 
the Keio majority. Accordingly, the opin­
ion stressed that whether a particular 
proposed use is a "public use" is a ques­
tion of law to be resolved by the courts 
and "the courts owe no deference to a 
legislative finding that the proposed tak­
ing will provide financial benefit to a 
community." Id. at 22. 
Some early media reports of the 
Norwood decision suggested that it 
called for heightened judicial scrutiny 
of any exercise of eminent domain. 
This is not so. The opinion does 
explicitly call for heightened scrutiny 
when a court reviews an eminent 
domain statute or regulation under the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine-an issue 
raised here due to the lack of clear 
guidance in the Norwood code's defini­
tion of the term "deteriorating"-but 
the court did not extend heightened 
scrutiny beyond that issue. Rather, the 
opinion emphasized that courts retain a 
vital, albeit limited, role in reviewing 
exercises of eminent domain and 
should not simply defer to legislative 
judgments. The opinion criticized the 
lower courts in Ohio for their "misun­
derstanding of the scope of review" by 
engaging in an "artificial judicial defer­
ence to the state's determination that 
there was sufficient public use." Id. at 
16. In the court's view, the correct role 
for the judiciary, while limited, remains 
vital: " ... it is for the courts to ensure 
that the legislature's exercise of power 
is not beyond the scope of its authority, 
and that the power is not abused by 
irregular or oppressive use, or use in 
bad faith." Id. at 19. 
Having "clarified" the courts' 
"proper role as arbiters of the scope of 
eminent domain," the opinion consid­
ered whether economic gain alone is a 
sufficient public use to support an 
exercise of eminent domain. Citing 
with approval the analyses of the dis­
senters in both the United States 
Supreme Court and Connecticut 
Supreme Court Keio opinions, and the 
Michigan Supreme Court's opinion in 
Wayne County v. Hathcock, 4 the Ohio 
court ruled that while "economic bene­
fit can be considered as a factor among 
others in determining whether there is 
a sufficient public use and benefit in a 
taking, it cannot serve as the sole basis 
for finding such a benefit." City of 
Norwood v. Horney, 2006 WL 2096001 
at 22. 
In so holding, the Ohio court made 
no effort to address Justice John Paul 
Stevens's carefully argued majority 
opinion in Keio, which stressed the fac­
tors a court must examine to determine 
whether the use of eminent domain for 
economic development alone is truly 
serving a legitimate public purpose 
rather than improperly promoting a 
purely private benefit. Had the Ohio 
court approved those factors, emphasiz­
ing public participation and compre­
hensive planning, and then applied 
them to the facts in this ·case without 
"artificial judicial deference," it could 
easily have called into question and 
struck down this particular exercise of 
eminent domain solely for economic 
development without adopting a rule 
prohibiting all such uses of the con­
demnation power. · 
As previously noted, the court also 
held that heightened scrutiny should 
be applied to definitions in eminent 
domain statutes and ordinances. 
Having already determined that an 
individual's property interest is a fun­
damental right under the Ohio 
Constitution, the court held that in 
reviewing an eminent domain statute 
or regulation under the void-for-vague­
ness doctrine, courts should "utilize the 
heightened standard of review 
employed for a statute or regulation 
that implicates a First Amendment or 
other fundamental constitutional right. 
Id. at 24. In Norwood, the challenged 
definition was for a "deteriorating 
area," which was the basis for finding 
the plaintiffs' properties could be con­
demned. The Norwood code provided 
an extensive list of conditions that 
would support a finding that an area 
was "deteriorated," including: incom­
2. See, e.g., Gerijo, Inc. v. 
Fairfield, 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 638 
N.E.2d 533 (1994)(holding that a 
party who attacks municipal zon­
ing ordinance on constitutional 
grounds must prove, beyond fair 
debate, bolh that enactment 
deprives him or her of economi­
cally viable use and that it fails to 
advance legitimate governmental 
interest.) 
3. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255 (1980), overruled by 
Ung le v. Chevron U.SA, Inc., 125 
S.Ct. 207 4 (2005). 
4. 471 Mich. 445, 684 N.W.2d 
765 (2004)(overnuling Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 
410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455.) 
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The Norwood decision is, however, not the last word on eminent 
domain in Ohio. 
patible or nonconforming land uses, 
lack of adequate parking facilities, 
faulty street arrangement, obsolete 
platting, and diversity of ownership. 
The court expressed skepticism about 
these factors, noting that they "exist in 
virtually every urban American neigh­
borhood," Id. at 25, and thus were sus­
pect. The court also noted that some of 
the factors listed in the definition­
such as "diversity of ownership"-were 
themselves not defined in the 
Norwood code and thus would be sus­
ceptible to different meanings. 
Applying heightened scrutiny to the 
definition of "deteriorating area" as the 
standard for a condemnation in the 
Norwood code, the court found it void 
for vagueness "because it fails to afford 
a property owner fair notice and invites 
subjective interpretation." Further, the 
court held "that the term 'deteriorating 
area' cannot be used as a standard for a 
taking, because it inherently incorpo­
rates speculation as to the future condi­
tion of the property into the decision 
on whether a taking is proper rather 
than focusing that inquiry on the prop­
erty's condition at the time of the pro­
posed taking." Id. at 26. 
While the court's skepticism about 
the vagueness of these terms is not mis­
placed, the implications of a ban on tar­
geting a "deteriorated area" for redevel­
opment by eminent domain are 
distressing. Cities in declining urban 
areas will not be well served by having 
to wait for an area to finish "deteriorat­
ing" and arrive at "blighted" or slum sta­
tus before intervening through a well­
planned economic development project. 
This part of the court's opinion calls out 
for a response from the planning com­
munity. A worthwhile research project 
would be an effort to document objec­
tive measurements that would allow 
planners to predict with a high degree of 
confidence that a "deteriorating area" 
that falls below a set of thresholds for 
well-defined factors (e.g., absentee own­
ership, abandoned/vacant property, 
unemployment, residents 20 percent or 
more below the poverty level, etc.) will, 
without public sector intervention, inex­
orably decline into blight. This should 
address the Ohio-or any other--court's 
vagueness concerns and allow a city to 
take preventive measures to salvage a 
neighborhood sooner rather than later. 
Finally, the court also held that 
statute ORC § 163.19, which had 
allowed the city to obtain and transfer 
titles to condemned properties when 
it deposited with the court the full 
amount of the compensation awards, 
was unconstitutional because it vio­
lated the separation of powers princi­
ple. The court emphasized that once a 
condemnation case enters a court's 
jurisdiction, it has the inherent 
authority to take any lawful action 
regarding the subject matter of the lit­
igation, including the issuance of a 
stay or injunction. This inherent. 
authority regarding matters over 
which it has jurisdiction is exclusively 
within the constitutional realm of the 
courts and it is beyond the power of 
the legislature to limit that constitu­
tional authority. The importance of 
this last procedural holding cannot be 
overemphasized. Developers under­
stand that time is money and are far 
less likely to request that a city use its 
eminent domain power if acquisition 
can be stayed or enjoined pending the 
exhaustion of one or more appeals. 
The Norwood decision is, however, 
not the last word on eminent domain 
in Ohio. Just five days after the 
court's ruling, a state legislative task 
force on eminent domain, formed in 
reaction to Keio, issued its final report. 
While the report affirms Norwood's 
ban on using eminent domain solely 
for economic gain, it proposes that 
government should still be allowed to 
use eminent domain to eradicate 
blight. The report calls for a state con­
stitutional amendment to establish a 
uniform definition of blight statewide 
and allow cities to use eminent 
domain so long as a bare majority of 
the properties in a given area meet 
that definition. 
WHY SUCH A REACTION TO KELO? 
Ohio is unique, to date, in having had 
both a legislative and state supreme 
court response to Keio. But the vast 
majority of states-more than 40 as of 
early summer 2006-were considering 
legislation in reaction to the Keio rul­
ing, and 15 had already enacted such 
legislation. 5 • • 
The intensity and extent of the neg­
ative reaction to the Keio ruling has 
been almost unprecedented. Why is 
this? Three factors stand out: first, the 
uncharacteristically shrill and alarmist 
tone of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's 
dissent; second, the change in the legal 
and political climate in the United 
States since the Court's last ruling on 
eminent domain, the 1984 case of 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 
U.S. 229 (1984) and third, the media's 
and public's outcry against the ruling.6 
The mere fact that Justice 
O'Connor dissented in Keio was a sur­
prise-but the tone of her dissenting 
opinion was a shock. Long seen as a 
moderate occupying a centrist position 
on the Court, in Keio, Justice O'Connor 
not only voted with the more conserva­
tive members of the Court but 
authored a dissent that rivaled any by 
the Court's most conservative Justice, 
Antonin Scalia. Despite Justice 
Stevens's carefully argued majority 
opinion stressing the factors a court 
must examine to determine whether 
the use of eminent domain for eco­
nomic development is truly serving a 
5. The 15 states are Alabama, 
Delaware, Georgia, Idaho. 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, 
Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, 
Texas, Utah, Vennont, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. In addi­
tion, Pennsylvania legislation (H.B. 
1835, H.B. 1836, 189th Gen. 
Assam., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005)) is 
awaiting the governor's action; 
New Hampshire has placed an 
eminent domain constitutional 
amendment on the November 
2006 ballot (Con. Res. 30, 2006 
Leg., 159th Sess. (N.H. 2006)); 
and a New Mexico act was 
vetoed by the governor (H.B. 746, 
47th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2006)). 
6. For example, American 
Ccnservative Union (ACU) 
Chainnan David Keene stated: 
"It is outrageous to think that the 
government can take away your 
home any time It wants to build a 
shopping mall. The Keio ruling is 
a slap in the face to property 
owners everywhere." ACU Press 
Release, Judicial ActMsm Strikes 
Again (June 23, 2005), available 
at www.conservative.org/press­
room/06232005_un.asp. 
Although it is uncertain whether the media outcry heightened 
public opposition to the Keio ruling, only one other Supreme 
Court case has sparked a similarly extreme reaction: Roe v. Wade, 
the 1973 decision upholding a woman's right to an abortion. 
legitimate public purpose (rather than 
improperly promoting a purely private 
benefit), Justice O'Connor's dissent 
insisted that the majority's ruling made 
neady all private property "susceptible 
to condemnation." 125 S. Ct. 2655, 
2677 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
Hammering the point home, she 
declared: "The specter of condemna­
tion hangs over all property. Nothing is 
to prevent the State fr.om replacing any 
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home 
with a shopping mall, or any farm with 
a factory." Id. at 2676 
Justice O'Connor's inflamed rheto­
ric was immediately picked up and 
widely disseminated by advocates of 
the so-called "property rights move­
ment," which was still in its infancy 
when Midkiff was decided in 1984. 7 
The media also appeared to have 
been strongly influenced by Justice 
O'Connor's rhetoric, perhaps because 
capitalizing on the hyperbole of 
"replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz­
Carlton" proved irresistible when 
compared with the parsed tone of 
Justice Stevens's opinion. A forthcom­
ing law review article that surveys the 
print and electronic media coverage 
of the Keio decision concludes that 
the overwhelming majority of news 
stories and editorials have been criti­
cal of the ruling.8 
Although it is uncertain whether the 
media outcry heightened-or simply 
reflected-public opposition to the 
Keio ruling, it is clear that in the past 
half-century, only one other Supreme 
Court case has sparked a similarly 
extreme reaction: Roe v. Wade, the 1973 
decision upholding a woman's right to 
an abortion. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) At 
first, it seems implausible that the 
power of eminent domain could rank 
with abortion as a hot-button issue for 
the American public, but one critical 
factor links the two decisions: Each 
was seen as allowing government to 
"violate" a "right" that many viewed as 
inviolable. Thus, while the rulings dif­
fered doctrinally-Roe deciding that 
the federal Constitution limited state 
government authority (over Jane Roe's 
"right" to make decisions about her 
body) and Keio deciding that the fed­
eral Constitution did not limit state 
government authority (over Susette 
Kelo's "right" to make decisions about 
her home)-both decisions deeply 
offended a large portion of the country 
because each "legalized" an action 
viewed by many as immoral: destroy­
ing a life in Roe and destroying a home 
in Keio. 
A critical difference between the 
two decisions, however, was their 
effect on existing law. Roe was truly a 
landmark case: For the first time, the 
Supreme Court found a "right to pri­
vacy" guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause of the federal Constitution. 
Keio, in contrast, merely followed the 
Court's precedents in ruling that the 
power of eminent domain could be 
used for a public purpose (such as eco­
nomic development), as well as for a 
public use.9 Moreover, the Keio major­
ity made it clear that states were free 
to impose greater limits on the power 
of eminent domain than those required 
by the federal Constitution. 10 In fact, 
starting long before Keio was decided, a 
number of states had already inter­
preted their state constitutions as 
either barring or significantly limiting 
condemnation for economic develop­
ment purposes. 11 
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Given that Keio really did not 
change the state of the law, what 
arguably accounts for the virulence of 
the reaction to it is the combined effect 
of the other two factors: Justice 
O'Connor's inflammatory rhetoric, and 
a well-organized and well-financed 
property rights movement eager to fan 
those flames. 
The Legislative Reaction: Congress 
Both Congress and the majority of state 
legislatures reacted to Keio by introduc­
ing, and in some instances enacting, 
laws ranging from authorizing a legisla­
tive study of the eminent domain ques­
tions raised by Keio, through tinkering 
with condemnation procedures, to 
severe restrictions on its use. 12 While a 
number of bills were introduced in the 
U.S. House and Senate, the major 
"Keio bill" in Congress is H.R. 4128, 
introduced by James Sensenbrenner 
(R-Wis.), which passed the House in 
November 2005 by a vote of 376--38 
but has since been languishing in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. Private 
Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, 
H.R. 4128, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2005). That bill seeks to prevent the 
use of eminent domain for economic 
development by denying federal eco­
nomic development funds to any state 
or local government that uses eminent 
domain to transfer private property to 
other private parties for economic 
development purposes. The proposed 
funding ban is for two years following a 
judicial determination that the law has 
been violated, and the bill allows for 
private rights of action to enforce the 
law. Id. 
Another far more limited measure 
addressing economic development has 
noted that "One of the key quotes 7. The movement's intellectual 
from the Court to keep in mind "father." University of Chicago law 
today was written by Justice professor Richard Epstein. would 
O'Connor•... who wrote. 'Af'rfnot publish his conservative cri­
property may now be taken for the tique of takings and eminent 
benefit of another private party. domain until the following year 
but the fallout from this decision (RICHARD EPsTBN, TAKJNGS: PRIVATE 
will not be random. The beneficiar· PROPERTY ANO THE PONER OF 
EMINENT DoMAJN, Harvard University ies are likely to be those citizeris 
with disproportionate influence Press. 1985); the Federalist 
Society had been formed by a and power in the political process. 
group of law students only two including large corporations and 
development firms.'" IJ Pressyears before; and the Institute of 
Justice (IJ). which represented Release, Homeowners Lose 
Susette Keio, was not founded Eminent Domain Gase (June 23, 
until 1991. The IJ's press release 2005) www.ij.org/private_prop­
in response to the Keio rullng erty/connecticut/6_23_05pr.html. 
8. Daniel H. Cole. Why Keio Is Not 11. Cole. supra note 8. identifies 
Good News for Local Planners the following states. with the date 
and Developers, GA. ST. u. L REV. of the ruling in parentheses: Maine 
(forthcoming 2006). A draft is (1957); Arkansas (1967); South 
available at http://indylaw.indi­ Carolina (1978); Kentucky (1979); 
ana.edu/instructors/cole/cole.htm. Washington (1981); New 
Hampshire (1985); Illinois (2002); 9. See. e.g.. Benman v. Parker. 
and Michigan (2004). 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
12. The Ohio law. Amended 10. "We emphasize that nothing in 
Substitute S.B. 167. 126th Gen. our op1nkin precludes any State 
Assem. (Ohio 2005). imposes a from placing further restrictions on 
moratorium until the end of 2006rts exercise of the taikngs pcwer. 
on the use of eminent domain for lrdeed, many States already impcse 
economic development purposes 'public use' requirements that are 
that would ultimately result in the stricter than the federal baseline." 
property being transferred to 125 s. Ct. 2655. 2677 (2005). 
another private party in an area 
that is not blighted, and it creates 
a task force to study eminent 
domain issues. Delaware's law, 
S.B. 217 wrth H. Amendment 1, 
143 Gen. Assem. (Del. 2005). 
would limit the use of eminent 
domain to a "stated public pur­
pcse" or a "recognized public 
use.n The law in Texas, S.B. 7, 
79th Leg .• 2d Sess. (Tex. 2005). 
prohibits the use of eminent 
domain to confer a private benefit 
on a private party or for economic 
development purpcses (but con­
tains certain exemptions). 
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More recently, on June 23, 2006, President George W. Bush 
issued an Executive Order limiting the use of eminent domain 
by federal agencies. 
already been enacted by Congress. 
(Transportation, Treasury, Housing and 
Urban Development, the Judiciary, the 
District of Columbia, and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 
2396 (2005)). Sen. Kit Bond (R-Mo.) 
successfully attached an amendment to 
a federal appropriations bill that pro­
hibits use of funds appropriated under 
the act for "economic development 
that primarily benefits private entities," 
and requires the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) to submit to Congress, 
within one year, a study "on the nation­
wide use of eminent domain." Id. Since 
the funding prohibition does little more 
than echo existing law-Keio prohibits 
eminent domain that "primarily bene­
fits private entities"-the effect of the 
so-called Bond Amendment remains to 
be seen; namely, in the findings the 
GAO will report from its study. The 
passage of the Bond Amendment has 
taken the wind out of the sails for those 
pushing to enact H.R. 4128, as it 
appears the Senate is content to await 
the forthcoming GAO study before tak­
ing any further action. 
More recently, on June 23, 2006, 
President George W. Bush issued an 
Executive Order limiting the use of 
eminent domain by federal agencies. 13 
The Order, titled "Protecting the 
Property Rights of the American 
People," limits "the taking of private 
property by the Federal Government to 
situations in which the taking is for 
public use, with just compensation, and 
for the purpose of benefiting the gen­
eral public and not merely for the pur­
pose of advancing the economic inter­
est of private parties to be given 
ownership or use of the property 
taken." Given the Keio Court's broad 
definition of "public use" and its recog­
nition that a condemnation "merely" to 
benefit private parties would not meet 
even that broad definition, this 
Executive Order appears to do nothing 
more than restate the Court's ruling in 
terms that sound as though they are 
protecting property rights, but actually 
have no substantive effect. 
The most recent "takings" bill, H.R. 
4722 (the Private Property Rights 
Implementation Act of 2006), passed 
by the House in late September, is not 
a direct reaction to the Keio ruling since 
it deals with regulatory takings rather 
than the exercise of eminent domain .. 
While a full discussion of that bill is 
beyond the scope of this Commentary, 
it would allow those claiming that a 
state or local regulation has taken their 
property to bring that claim in federal 
court without first seeking just com­
pensation in state court as has been 
required since Williamson County v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), 
and would also make it easier for prop­
erty owners to claim that rezonings or 
dedication/exaction requirements are 
unconstitutional takings. 
The Legislative Reaction: States 
By the summer of 2006, legislation in 
response to Keio had been enacted or 
introduced in more than 40 states. 14 
These legislative proposals and enact­
ments can be placed into several dis­
tinct categories. 
The most radical are those that seek 
to "repeal" Keio by effectively banning, 
or placing severe limitations on, the use 
of eminent domain for economic devel­
opment purposes. Legislation in this 
category can seek to accomplish that 
Search hundreds of abstracts 
on PEL Online 
www.planning.org/pel 
goal in various ways. Some measures 
simply prohibit the use of eminent 
domain for "economic development"­
using that exact term-while others use 
language such as "for the primary pur­
poses of creating jobs, generating tax 
revenue" or "to transfer private prop­
erty to another private use" to identify 
the prohibited purpose. Alabama, the 
first state to enact legislation in 
response to Keio, took this approach in 
August 2005 in legislation that pro­
hibits the use of condemnation "for the 
purpose of nongovernmental retail, 
office, commercial, residential, or 
industrial development or use ...." 
[ALA. CODE§ 18-lB-1 (2005)]. Legis­
lation in other states accomplishes the 
same goal by limiting eminent domain 
to achieving a "public use," and then 
defining that term so as to exclude eco­
nomic development. Examples are a 
bill introduced in South Carolina that 
defines "public use" as requiring the 
"possession, occupation and enjoyment 
of the condemned property by the pub­
lic at large or by public agencies" [H.B. 
4310, 116th Gen. Assem. (S.C. 2006)] 
and in South Dakota, which prohibits 
the use of eminent domain either to 
transfer condemned property "to any 
private person, nongovernmental 
entity, or other public-private business 
entity; or primarily for enhancement of 
tax revenue" [H.B. 1080 (S.D. 2006)]. 
Before describing other categories 
of anti-Keio legislation, the Alabama 
law is worth discussing further 
because it illustrates a critical point: 
the importance of a detailed analysis 
of the actual legislative proposal or 
enactment. While the Alabama law 
seemingly bans condemnation for eco­
nomic development, it contains a cru­




14. The APA website tracks emi­
nent domain legislation; see 
www.planning.org~egislation/emi­
nentdomain. 
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Another significant category of legislation comprises laws that 
either prohibit condemnation of residential property or impose 
additional compensation requirements for acquisition of such 
property. 
cial exception: It does not apply to 
the exercise of eminent domain 
"based upon a finding of blight in an 
area covered by any redevelopment 
plan or urban renewal plan." [ALA. 
CODE§ 18-lB-1 (2005)). In the view 
of one property rights group, this 
exception swallows the rule and 
effectively allows Alabama cities and 
development agencies to take private 
property for economic development 
because other provisions of state law 
define "blight" broadly. 15 An 'Indiana 
bill, S.B. 391, has a similar loophole. 
It prohibits condemnation for "com­
mercial use," but exempts property 
that is blighted, or cases where "it is 
likely that the property will promote 
employment or create business oppor­
tunities." [S.B. 391, l 14th Gen. 
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006)). 
In other states, legislation that con­
tains a "blight exception" to a general 
ban on condemnation for economic 
development--or limits condemnation 
to blighted property-is more restrictive. 
Texas, for example, enacted a ban on 
condemnation for economic develop­
ment with a "blight exemption" in 
September 2005, just a month after 
Alabama, but the Texas law adopted a 
far more restrictive definition of blight, 
requiring that the condemnation seek to 
"eliminate an existing affirmative harm 
on society from slum or blight areas." 
[TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.§ 2206.001(b)(3) 
(2005).) The critical term here is "affir­
mative harm," which refers to a distinc­
tion that Justice O'Connor emphasized 
in her Keio dissent. She noted that the 
Supreme Court's prior approvals of emi­
nent domain had all involved uses that 
"inflicted affirmative harm on society"; 
thus, she reasoned, the only permissible 
use of eminent domain for a "public 
purpose" is to address a police power 
violation or a public nuisance-a far 
more constricted scope for eminent 
domain than the majority's view that the 
condemnation power is coextensive with 
the police power. Keio, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 
2674 (2005) (O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
Other examples of legislation that 
places greater limits than those of Keio 
on a government's ability to use emi­
nent domain to address blight include 
measures in Arizona, which limits con­
demnation to "slum" property and 
requires that the determination be 
made on a property-by-property, not 
areawide, basis, and imposes a two­
thirds supermajority requirement on 
the legislative body making the deter­
mination, H.B. 2675, 47th Leg., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006) (vetoed by the 
governor on June 6, 2006); Oklahoma, 
which redefines "blighted area" as a 
place where the presence of a majority 
· of listed factors substantially impairs 
the sound development and growth of 
the area as a menace to the public 
health, safety, morals, or welfare of the 
area, and redefines a "blighted prop­
erty" to be a structure that endangers 
life or property due to its unsafe condi­
tions [S.B. 1066, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Okla. 2006)); and Illinois, limiting 
condemnation to a "blighted area," and 
further requiring that prior to the con­
demnation, the condemning govern­
mental entity enter into an agreement 
with a private entity to undertake the 
proposed redevelopment project [S.B. 
3086, 94th Gen Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 
2006); (sent to the governor on June 1, 
2006)). 
Another significant category of leg­
islation comprises laws that either 
prohibit condemnation of residential 
property or impose additional com­
pensation requirements for acquisi­
tion of such property. Some of these 
limit the protection to primary resi­
dences or to acquisition for particular 
purposes. Legislation calling for addi­
tional compensation takes two basic 
forms: requiring compensation to 
exceed fair market value (FMV), as 
with Indiana's H.B. 1010, which was 
signed by Gov. Mitch Daniels on 
March 24, 2006, requiring 150 percent 
of FMV for acquisition of a primary 
residence, [H.B. 1010, 114th Gen. 
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006)) or 
allowing for the reimbursement of 
costs not normally covered, such as 
S.B. 2746 in Illinois, which permits 
the reimbursement of condemnees' 
appraisal costs, legal fees, and reloca­
tion expenses. [S.B. 2746, 94th Gen. 
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006)) Illinois 
is not unique in considering the com­
pensation issue more broadly than the 
residential context; several other 
states are pondering whether just 
compensation should include com­
pensation to displaced renters and 
business lessees. 16 
Moreover, a number of proposals 
seek to restrain abuses of eminent 
domain by enhancing procedural pro­
tections. Many of these involve the 
imposition of a two-thirds or three­
fourths supermajority voting require­
ment on legislative approvals of con­
demnations, or enhanced notice to 
intended condemnees of imminent 
governmental action. Delaware 
enacted such legislation in July 2005, 
requiring six months' notice prior to 
initiating condemnation procedures, a 
public hearing prior to condemnation, 
and the publication of a report describ­
ing the purpose for the exercise of emi­
nent domain; the law also requires that 
the government pay attorneys fees for 
parties in condemnation proceedings. 
[DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 29, §§ 9503 & 
9505 (2005)). 
Another category of state legislation 
addressing perceived abuse of eminent 
domain comprises measures allowing a 
former owner to reacquire condemned 
property if the purpose for which it was 
15. Timothy Sandefur, The 
"Backlash" So Far: Will Citizens 
Get Meaningful Eminent Domain 
Reform? A.L.1.· A.BA Continuing 
Legal Education, January 5-7, 
2006; SL049 ALl·ABA 703 
(Westlaw). Working Paper No. 05· 
105 (2005), p. 20. 
16. See, e.g., FL ST. § 73.071 
{allowing business owners, includ­
ing lessees, to make c;:laims for 
"business damages") and A.8. 
9050 (NY 2005·05 Regular 
Session) (compensating tenants 
who have resided at the property 
for six months or more). 
Despite the concerted efforts of property rights advocates, it 
appears that more moderate voices are now beginning to be 
heard. 
acquired under eminent domain does 
not come to fruition. Some proposals 
provide a right to repurchase if the 
condemned property is not used for 
the stated public purpose or for a pub­
lic use within a specified period of · 
time (10 years after condemnation, for 
example, in South Carolina) [H.B. 
4292, 116th Gen. Assem. (S.C. 2006)]; 
others either require the government 
to offer the property back to the origi­
nal owner (for example, in Oklahoma, 
at the lower of FMV or the price that 
was originally paid) [S.B.1035, 50th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2006)] or to 
allow the former owner to petition the 
government for the property's return if 
it is not used for a public purpose. 
Some of the state laws and propos­
als postpone any substantive reaction 
to Keio until completion of a study, the 
approach adopted in the Bond 
Amendment. 17 For example, Ohio S.B. 
167, signed into law by Gov. Bob Taft 
in November 2005, created a 
"Legislative Task Force to Study 
Eminent Domain" that was to report 
back to the Legislature by August 1, 
2006-which, as noted previously, it 
has-and imposed a moratorium on 
eminent domain for economic develop­
ment until December 31, 2006. This 
law is another example that shows "the 
devil is in the details" for these various 
proposals, as the moratorium applies 
only to condemnation of land for eco­
nomic development purposes if the 
land is not blighted and the condemna­
tion was "initiated on or after the 
effective date" of the act. [Amended 
Substitute S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assem. 
(Ohio 2005)] In New Mexico, Gov. Bill 
Richardson created a similar study task 
force in June after vetoing legislation 
that would have barred condemnation 
for economic development, 18 and 
Indiana and Tennessee are considering 
proposals authorizing similar studies. 19 
Finally, and of greatest concern to 
planners and local officials, were the 
efforts by "property rights" advocates 
in a number of western states to capi­
talize on the public's distaste for the 
Keio ruling by placing on the ballot 
measures that couple restrictions on 
eminent domain with compensation 
mandates for regulations that lower 
property values, the latter modeled on 
Oregon's notorious Measure 37. 20 
Ballot measures to limit both eminent 
domain and regulatory powers were 
initially scheduled to appear in six 
western states21 this November, but 
court rulings removed them from the 
ballot in Montana (citing fraud in 
obtaining the petitions) and Nevada 
(ordering the removal of sections on 
regulatory takings because two sepa­
rate issues cannot be combined in a 
single ballot measure). Washington's 
Initiative 933 and California's 
Proposition 90 exemplifed the meas­
ures that remained on the ballot. The 
Washington Initiative most closely 
resembled Measure 37. It would 
require government either to exempt 
property owners from regulations 
approved after 1995 that diminished 
their property values or compensate 
them for the diminution. The 
California Proposition focused almost 
entirely on eminent domain, but had 
one small subsection that required 
government to compensate property 
owners for "damage" to their property 
when "government action" results in 
"substantial economic loss." 
WHERE ARE WE NOW? 
Despite the concerted efforts of prop­
erty rights advocates, it appears that 
more moderate voices are now begin­
ning to be heard. In contrast to the ver­
itable flood of invective against Keio 
immediately following the decision, we 
are now hearing and seeing a different 
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message. Congress and several states 
have chosen to study the issue of emi­
nent domain, rather than rush an ill­
considered "quick fix" into law. The 
media has begun to feature stories that 
question the call of Keio opponents for 
a ban on the use of eminent domain for 
economic development. In the last few 
months, for example, stories have 
appeared in the New York Times and 
other major newspapers stressing how 
difficult it might be to move forward 
with major real estate developments if 
eminent domain is not an available 
tool. 22 
In addition, as eminent domain 
proposals slowly move through the 
legislative process and we get further 
away from the initial uproar against 
Keio, we should expect that other 
interest groups that have been rela­
tively quiet will start to assert their 
views to lawmakers. Such groups are 
not limited to real estate developers 
and advocates for local government. 
Groups concerned with protecting 
lower income and minority neighbor­
hoods, for example, are beginning to 
recognize that the "blight exceptions" 
in many legislative proposals will 
make their constituencies even more 
vulnerable than before Keio. The 
mobilization of "pro-Keio" interests, 
combined with the "let's study the 
problem" approach in Congress and a 
growing number of states, suggests 
that much of the legislation that 
finally emerges in response to Keio 
may be more nuanced and less dra­
conian than originally feared. Indeed, 
some of the legislation will be a 
much-needed improvement on the 
status quo. There are few reasons, if 
any, to argue against enhanced proce­
dural protections for condemnees so 
long as these do not impose unneces­
sary delays. The same is true for pro­
posals that seek to ensure compensa­
17. Transportation, Treasury, Hous­
ing and Urban Development, the 
Judiciary, the District of Columbia, 
and Independent Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 
2396 (2005). 
18. The bill is H.B. 746, 47th Leg., 
2d Sess. (N.M. 2006). Barry 
Massey, Governor Vetoes Eminent 
Domain Legislation, FREE NEW 
MEXICAN, Mar. 8, 2006, WWW. on Eminent Domain issued its Final 
freenewmexlcan.com/news/40445. Report in November, 2005 (avail­
html. able at www.in.gov~egislative/ 
interim/ccmmittee/2005/commrr­19. H.B. 2428/S.B.2424 (Tenn. 
2006) (would create a special joint teesficed.htm~. 
committee to study the exercise of 20. For a description and evaluation 
eminent domain in this state and of Measure 37, see Edward J. 
report rrs findings to the 105th Sullivan, Year Zero: The Aftermath 
General Assembly by February 1, of Measure 37, 38 uRB. LAW. 237 
2007); the Indiana Legislative (2006); and wrrh Carrie A. Richter, A 
Council's Interim Study Committee Taste of Ashes-The MacPherson 
Decision and the Future of Oregon's 
Planning Program' 58 PLANNING & 
ENVTL. LAW 4 (2006). 
21. Arzona, California, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, and Washington. 
22. See, e.g., Editorial, Eminent 
Good Sense, N.Y. TIMES, April g, 
2006, Section 14LI, Page 17; Terry 
Pristin, Developers Can't Imagine a 
World Without Eminent Domain, 
N.Y. TIMES, January 18, 2006. 
In states that shackle government regulatory powers with Measure 37­
like legislation, voters will soon learn whether exemptions from land 
use regulation-or payment of compensation-to property owners 
who claim harm is a viable public policy. 
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tion for the full range of costs borne 
by those whose property is con­
demned; to provide assistance for 
renters, business tenants, and others 
who are displaced by eminent domain 
but who themselves are not property 
owners; or that permit a former owner 
to reacquire property condemned for 
a project that never comes to fruition. 
No doubt some states will choose a 
more extreme route and enact laws that 
effectively limit eminent domain to the 
most "traditional" public uses: roads, 
public utility facilities, airports, and the 
like. By the time you read this, voters 
in other states may have already 
approved November ballot measures 
that impose compensation/exception 
requirements on government regula­
tion. But even those outcomes may 
prove to be a blessing in disguise. It 
will allow the public, over time, to com­
pare outcomes such as inner city revital­
ization in those states whose response 
to Keio is well-considered reform with 
those that enact the most severe restric­
tions on the availability of eminent 
domain. Similarly, in states that shackle 
government regulatory powers with 
Measure 37-like legislation, voters will 
soon learn whether exemptions from 
land use regulation-or payment of 
compensation-to property owners who 
claim harm is a viable public policy. In 
short, by giving a green light to states to 
experiment with different approaches 
to reforming eminent domain (and in 
some instances even regulatory taking 
principles)--an approach famously 
dubbed "the laboratory of the states" 
by Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis23-the legislative and judicial 
reactions to Keio may provide us with 
data we now lack about how to make 
eminent domain a more effective tool 
for economic development while curb­
ing the shortcomings that have eroded 
public support for its use. 
23. ''To stay experimentation laboratory; and try novel 
in things social and eco­ social and economic exper­
nomic ls a grave responsibil­ iments without risk to the 
ity. Denial of the right to rest of the country." New 
experiment may be fraught State Ice Co. v. Uebmann, 
with serious consequences 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
to the Nation. It is one of the (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
happy incidents of the fed­
eral system that a single 
courageous State may. if its 
citizens choose, serve as a 
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